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Foreword: European Commission's Competence Centre on 
Modelling 
The Commission uses modelling to assess the environmental, economic, and social 
impacts of policy options and initiatives. Models are also used in other phases of the 
policy cycle, for instance to support the EU policy implementation. 
The Commission’s increasing focus on quantification of EU policy requires cross-cutting 
and robust approaches. The Competence Centre on Modelling brings under one umbrella 
the Commission's competencies and best practice in building and using models for 
greater quality and transparency in policy making. 
In this way it contributes to the Commission's Better Regulation policy, to the Inter-
Institutional Agreement on Better Law Making, and to the Communication on Data, 
Information and Knowledge Management at the European Commission. 
Starting with a Commission-wide modelling inventory (MIDAS, documenting over 200 
models in use by the Commission), it supports a proper documentation, use, and reuse 
of models by making available years of experience in the area of baseline scenarios, 
uncertainty analysis and sensitivity analysis, and social multi-criteria evaluation. 
The Competence Centre on Modelling helps to identify common approaches to quality and 
transparency of model use. A new community of practice on modelling will combine a 
web-based forum for sharing best practice and topical knowledge with events and 
training activities. 
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Abstract 
An integral part of the model quality control and quality assurance at the European 
Commission is a scientific peer-review of models, including those developed and used by 
its Directorate-General Joint Research Centre (JRC). The present reports details the 
outcome of the review of the SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses (SYMBOL), 
which was carried out by an external scientific Review Panel closely following ‘Guidelines 
for the review of models used in support of EU policies’.1 The review aimed at verifying 
and consolidating the scientific credibility of SYMBOL and identifying most 
promising/relevant areas for a future model development. The report includes also a first 
reaction from the SYMBOL team, detailing among others how Review Panel’s suggestions 
will be addressed. 
 
 
 
 
                                           
1 European Commission (2018) Guidelines for the review of models used in support of EU policies, Directorate 
General Joint Research Centre. 
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1 Introductory remarks 
Model-based evidence is playing an increasing role in the European Commission’s policy 
support in general and the policy Impact Assessment (IA) process in particular. The 
Better Regulation Policy aims to ensure that EU decision-making is open and transparent 
and EU actions are based on evidence and understanding of the impacts.  
It is therefore of utmost importance that models used for policy support are credible and 
transparent both from a scientific point of view and from the perspective of Commission’s 
policy services, the Member States, and other stakeholders.  Information on aspects such 
as assumptions, model architecture, data quality, verification and policy representation 
mechanisms, needs to be made available, especially if the results of these models are 
used in policy documents and EC-endorsed studies. 
An integral part of the model quality control and quality assurance is a coherent approach 
for scientific peer-review of models, similar to practices in international organisations and 
national modelling institutes. The Directorate-General Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission has developed ‘Guidelines for the review of models used in 
support of EU policies’ which have been used in the review of the SYMBOL model. 
SYMBOL is an acronym of the SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses. 
The overall objective of the Model Review is to verify and consolidate the scientific 
credibility of models used for policy support in the Commission. This means that the 
review process assesses the documented model description and manual, the model 
performance, the results of sensitivity tests of the model, and the peer review status. 
Therefore, the specific objectives of the review are to assess to what extent: 
 The model is built following sound scientific principles, based on well-established 
data, grounded in the prevailing theoretical insights, has well-documented 
assumptions and embedded expert knowledge, and is described by appropriate 
mathematical concepts and language. 
 The model has been scrutinised in relevant scientific conferences and (for models 
already used for some time) has passed the peer review processes of top scientific 
journals in the field. 
 The model has been validated, has undergone sensitivity analysis, and its 
limitations are documented and published.  
 Model data, the theoretical framework and the empirical implementation 
(including model calibration) are transparently documented, stored publicly 
accessible, and shared with the relevant scientific community. 
 All model runs in support of EU policies are documented in detail – including 
source code and data – and stored accessibly so that, if needed, the reproduction 
of modelling results can be carried out at any time.  
 The results of model runs that are used in studies and policy documents are 
available on the EU Open Data Portal. 
 Links with relevant academic networks are established and maintained, e.g. 
through annual workshops, to ensure a continuous exposure of the model, the 
underlying data, and baseline scenario assumptions, etc. to the scientific 
community. 
 
Each review follows a process that consists of three steps.  
1. Well in advance, the modelling team is asked to provide the Review Panel with a 
complete model documentation. During the preparation of the review process, the 
Review Panel and modelling team may suggest a number of stylised scenario 
runs, the results of which would be discussed in-depth at the review meeting. The 
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modelling team also provides to the Review Panel five scientific papers and/or 
policy reports that they deem as their best and/or most relevant products. 
2. Face-to-face meetings of the model review (usually 1.5-2.5 days) consist of (i) a 
series of presentations, where the conceptual model structure, underlying data 
and policy simulations are presented by the modelling team to the Review Panel, 
and (ii) following consultative meetings where the Review Panel discusses 
internally and agrees on draft conclusions. 
3. In the weeks following review meetings, the Review Panel writes a model review 
report which is handed over to the modelling team, the senior management and is 
made publicly accessible. The modelling team is given opportunity address the 
comments in the draft model review and present suggestions for model 
improvements or additional runs. 
In order to ensure a rigorous, coherent and unbiased review, the model review is 
undertaken by an external scientific Review Panel. The Review Panel consists of 5-10 
experts in the domain of the model, and a Chair of the Review Panel. A Secretariat which 
provides administrative and secretarial support is provided through the JRC’s 
Competence Centre on Modelling. 
The report before you contains the results of the scientific review of the SYMBOL model 
as carried out from November 2017 to February 2018 by a Review Panel consisting of 
Leen Hordijk (chair), d'Artis Kancs (scientific secretary), Christoffer Kok (European 
Central Bank), Steven Ongena (University of Zurich), Loriana Pelizzon (University of 
Frankfurt). Short bio’s of the panel members can be found in Annex 1. The European 
Commission is very grateful to the members of the Review Panel for the time and effort 
they have put into carrying out this review. The Review Panel met at the site of the JRC 
in Ispra (Italy) on November 9 – 10, 2017. The meeting agenda can be found in Annex 2. 
The remainder of this report contains a short description of the SYMBOL model (section 
2), the results of the review (section 3), reply to the Review Report by the SYMBOL team 
(section 4) and conclusions (section 5). 
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2 Policy and model development background 
The economic and financial crisis decade ago and ensuing recessions have revealed a 
number of deficiencies in the EU banking sector. For example, a number of European 
banks were exposed to high levels of non-performing loans (NPLs). As noted by the 
European Commission (2018), elevated levels of NPLs have impact on the financial 
stability, as they weigh on the profitability and viability of affected institutions and have 
an impact, via reduced bank lending, on the economic growth. The recent crisis has also 
shown how quickly vulnerabilities on the financial side of economy can turn into a strong 
deterioration of public accounts. For example, in Ireland the gross public debt as a 
percentage of GDP has increased by almost 100 percentage points between 2007 and 
2013, whereas in Spain the debt ratio increased by more than 50 percentage points over 
the same time period (Benczur et al. 2015). 
In order to avoid these and other negative consequences on economies, the issue of 
NPLs is being increasingly tackled by policy makers. At the European level, since the 
latest financial crisis the Commission has been enforcing its efforts to address the issue 
of NPLs in relation to the countries concerned in the context of the European Semester. 
Building on the policy work initiated by the European Commission, the European Council 
has adopted a comprehensive "Action Plan to Tackle Non-Performing Loans in Europe" on 
11 July 2017. This Plan calls upon various actors to take appropriate measures to  further  
address  the  challenges  of  high  NPLs  in  the  EU,  recognising  the  balance between 
necessary actions by banks, Member States and the EU. It invites the European 
Commission and other institutions to take steps on several fronts to tackle both the 
legacy stock of NPLs and the risk of build-up in the future. 
Internationally, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued a revised Basel 
Accord in 2010-2011, which is a global regulatory framework on bank capital adequacy, 
stress testing, and market liquidity risk. This updated Basel Accord (after Basel I and 
Basel II) was developed in response to deficiencies in the financial regulation revealed by 
the last financial crisis in 2007–2008. Since Basel II, the Accord aims to strengthen bank 
capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. Basel 
II/III set international banking standards of how much capital banks are required to hold 
to guard against the financial and operational risks that banks face. 
Different approaches can used to determine how much capital a bank should hold. The 
Internal Rating-Based (IRB) approach adopted for Basel II/III focuses on the frequency 
of bank insolvencies arising from credit losses that supervisors are willing to accept. The 
Systemic Model of Banking Originated Losses model (SYMBOL) follows the IRB approach. 
SYMBOL can estimate the distribution of economic losses and liquidity shortfalls occurring 
in the banking sector, by taking into account contagion effects due to interbank positions. 
The SYMBOL model can evaluate banking-related policy questions by providing 
quantitative estimates of the order of magnitude with respect to changes in the 
regulatory framework. 
SYMBOL has been developed by the DG JRC in cooperation with researchers from 
academia and representatives from the DG FISMA during the aftermath of the latest 
financial crisis. Since its original version (as described in De Lisa et al. 2011), the 
SYMBOL model has been further developed in numerous ways. The panel acknowledges 
that steering the model development strategically and efficiently is a challenging task 
indeed, particularly in the context of progressing methodological advances, improving 
data availability and changing policy needs. This report reviews a 2017 version of the 
SYMBOL model and gives suggestions for its future development. 
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3 Strengths, caveats and suggestions 
3.1 Validity of the methodological approach 
SYMBOL is a micro-simulation portfolio model that implements the Basel II/III regulatory 
framework, which imposes that each bank satisfies regulatory capital requirements to 
guard against the risks the bank may face. This capital provides a buffer against 
unexpected losses at a specific level of statistical confidence (in Basel II/III fixed at the 
99.9% level). The amount of the regulatory capital necessary to support a portfolio of 
debt securities depends on the probability distribution of the portfolio loss of each bank 
(Vasicek, 2016). The SYMBOL model simulates this probability density function (PDF) of 
the banks’ credit portfolio. 
The starting point of the analysis is the Basel II/III regulatory framework, which provides 
a credit risk loss function linking balance sheet data (capital, total assets and risk) to the 
distribution of losses stemming from the portfolio of an individual bank. By inverting this 
Basel Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) formula for the credit risk allows to derive the 
average riskiness of the asset portfolio owned by each bank. Using the inverted IRB 
formula, each single implied obligor’s probability of default of each single bank is 
computed. Next, the average implied default probability (PD) for the asset portfolio of 
each bank is computed using information on the bank size (total assets) and its riskiness 
(capital and risk weighted assets). 
In a second step, correlated losses for banks are simulated via Monte Carlo using the 
above estimated implied default probability for the asset portfolio of each bank. Losses 
for individual banks are simulated by generating correlated normally distributed random 
shocks. The correlation of shocks among banks is either a consequence of the banks’ 
common exposure to the same borrower or, more generally, to a particular common 
influence of the business cycle. If at least one bank defaults, all data from the simulation 
run is kept; otherwise it is discarded. Simulation stops when 100 000 simulation runs 
with at least one default are generated. 
Given the simulated matrix of correlated bank losses, in a third step, the SYMBOL model 
determines which banks fail. A bank failure happens when simulated obligor portfolio 
losses exceed the sum of the bank’s expected losses and the total actual capital given by 
the sum of its minimum capital requirements plus the bank’s excess capital (if any). 
According to the Basel II/III regulatory framework, the Value at Risk threshold 
corresponds to a confidence level of 0.1%, i.e. the minimum capital requirement covers 
losses from the obligors’ portfolio with a probability of 99.9%. 
In a final step, an aggregated distribution of losses is computed for the whole banking 
system (an EU Member State, a group of countries or the whole EU). Aggregate losses 
are determined by summing losses in excess of capital of all distressed (default) banks in 
the system in each simulation run. This yields the distribution of the losses of the whole 
banking system. 
The Panel has assessed the validity of the methodological approach by aiming to 
establish whether the conceptual framework of the model is grounded in state-of-the-art 
theoretical insights, and whether the methodology implementing the model follows sound 
scientific principles. 
 
Strengths 
The credit risk loss function embedded in the Basel II and Basel III framework allows to 
derive an implied probability of default (PD) of the loan portfolio by inverting the IRB 
formula. Subsequently, individual banks’ gross losses can be simulated using Monte Carlo 
techniques. 
- The underlying Basel II/III framework implies that the model is consistent with 
the assumptions of the current Basel II/III regulation and therefore the objective: to 
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assess how changes in the regulation would affect bank losses is achieved under the 
same assumptions of the Bales II/III framework. 
- The adopted theoretical framework is internally consistent, the Team is aware of 
model strengths and limitations and have tried to address some of them with several ad-
hoc sensitivity analysis, as discussed under the model validity, see below. 
- The model is not a “black box”, as all key features of the model are transparently 
documented and published, they are easy to follow. 
- The team is very open for discussions about the key features and limitations of 
the modelling approach. 
 
Comments 
General methodological framework. It is well-known that the mechanism behind Basel 
II/III to determine bank losses is rather simplistic and the use of it might prevent the 
model to capture the true bank losses correctly. Among other, the underlying Basel II/III 
framework has the following critical limitations: 
- The correlation of the asset value between banks is constant and fixed at 50%. 
- The loss given default is set exogenously at 40%. 
- Asset value shocks are normally distributed, no fat tail or other assumptions about 
the distribution are introduced. 
- The collateralization of assets is not considered in the model. 
- Derivatives positions are also not considered in the model. 
- The model is considering all banks as homogenous. For example, their asset 
composition is assumed to be always the same and this is clearly not so in reality in a 
way that is relevant for loss outcomes. The only heterogeneity is introduced on the asset 
side by the size (i.e. different total assets). 
- The partial equilibrium perspective of the model by not accounting for potential 
feedback effects (e.g. by ignoring the banks’ likely reactions to losses such as 
deleveraging; see also discussion below) may bias the results. 
Given these assumptions and shortcuts of the underlying methodological approach, it 
cannot be excluded that they lead to an underestimation of potential losses. 
Contagion module. The SYMBOL model can include contagion effects between banks 
linked via the interbank market, though contagion effects are not included in the policy 
work in the current form. Instead, they are used in selected scientific work. 
- Only one channel of adjustment is considered in the contagion module: the 
interbank loan market, where the contagion effect is fixed at 40%. Other important 
channels, such as the portfolio similarity and secured interbank market and derivatives, 
cross holding of corporate bonds and sovereign exposure are missing. 
- Only domestic inter-bank relations are considered, though also cross border 
interlinkages through interbank markets could play a role, which is particularly important 
given the evidence of the recent financial crisis. 
- The current situation of the interbank market is that it is still not working very 
actively, instead, the collateralized interbank market is highly active. Fire-sales contagion 
effects generated by the asset and liability maturities mismatch are also not taken into 
account in the model. 
- Usually, the contagion module is not included in policy applications, which may 
lead to an underestimation of losses and distribution. 
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Suggestions 
- The Panel suggests that a more general modelling approach such as the more 
general copula model family should be developed, which among others is able to capture 
fat-tail distributions. 
- The inclusion of the interbank market (both secured and unsecured) in the 
analysis would be very important for capturing contagion effects. 
 
3.2 Model capacity to adequately address EC policy analysis needs 
The Panel has assessed the model capacity to adequately address EC policy analysis 
needs by aiming to establish whether the model can answer relevant policy questions in 
a sufficiently detailed/disaggregated way, and whether the model is capable to capture 
challenges faced by specificities of the banking sector? 
 
Strengths 
The model can answer a number of relevant policy questions by providing quantitative 
estimates of the order of magnitude with respect to changes in a wide range of 
regulatory frameworks. 
- For example, it can provide an estimate of the order of magnitude of changes in 
the distribution of bank losses after salient changes in the bank regulation. 
 
Comments 
Caution is warranted when interpreting and using the outcome of the model for policy 
purposes. Especially, the lack of the data granularity and the application of a number of 
simplifying assumptions may result in a lack of precision in terms of estimated losses as 
well as their cross-sectional and cross-country distributional effects. Some of the reasons 
for this lack of a full reliability on this account are as follows: 
- In general, the use of publicly available data with limited granularity at the bank 
level hampers the ability to account for heterogeneous bank characteristics. 
- Liquidity Ratio, Net Stable Funding Ratio and partially Leverage Ratio: a 
comparison of the effect on losses of each of these new regulations is missing.  
- The more recent regulation on financial markets is missing. If the purpose of the 
model is to check only the effects of Basel III then it is fine but, if the request is a more 
general assessment of the new regulation generated after the global financial crisis, then 
the new financial regulation should be included in the model. 
- The model assumes that the new capital requirement is satisfied by increasing 
capital and not by shrinking total bank assets or by an asset substitution. This disregards 
the potentially negative side of the new capital requirement, e.g., lending to corporates, 
and may underestimate the cost to the real economy and feedback effects on non-
performing loans. 
- Pillar 2 requirements are not taken into consideration, when calculating the 
minimum capital requirement.  
- Bail-in bank recovery and resolution part of the model is not fully in line with 
reality. 
 
Suggestions 
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- Due to critical assumptions and the use of limited public data, policy makers 
should not rely solely on the SYMBOL model. The use of complementary modelling tools 
as well as more granular data is encouraged.  
- Cooperation with banking authorities in terms of access to more granular data, 
such as the ECB and the EBA, and other modelling approaches, is encouraged in order to 
make the analysis more precise and hence more useful for policy makers in terms of the 
absolute amount of losses, for example. 
- When communicating model results to policy makers, it is important to highlight 
some of these limitations and caveats. In particular, when presenting results to policy 
makers, more effort could be made to communicate model uncertainty using ranges of 
simulation results. 
 
3.3 Adequacy and validity of data used in the model 
The main input variables in the SYMBOL model are Total Assets, Capital levels and Risk 
Weighted Assets. In order to construct a model database with a large coverage of the 
EU28 banking sector, usually, the Team relies on a commercial database such as 
Bankscope compiled by Bureau van Dijk. As in all public database, Bankscope data 
present certain quality and coverage issues, such as missing information or errors in the 
data compilation. In order to fix errors in the data compilation, the Team performs 
automatic checks to assure the internal coherence among variables. The detection and 
correction of incoherencies in the original Bankscope database consists of the following 
steps. 
First, in order to avoid using erroneous data (e.g. due to balance sheet incoherencies) or 
meaningless data for scope of the analysis (e.g. negative equity), observations (banks) 
are excluded from the sample if at least one of the following criteria is satisfied: 
 Total assets are not available; 
 Common equity is not available; 
 Tier one capital exceeds total assets; 
 Regulatory capital larger than total assets; 
 Common equity larger than total assets; 
 Negative common equity. 
Second, the issue of missing values is addressed. In order to have the largest possible 
set of information, at least for the main variables of the SYMBOL model i.e. capital (both 
as ratios and as amount) and risk weighted assets, the Team has developed a series of 
procedures based on robust regression. Robust regression uses estimators that are 
immune to specific model assumptions and their failures, while allow to identify outliers, 
i.e. observations which are distant from the bulk of the observed data and can hardly 
comply with model assumptions. In SYMBOL, the estimation of missing values is done 
using the Forward Search for Data Analysis (FSDA) of Atkinson and Riani (2000), which is 
implemented in the Matlab FSDA toolbox.  Missing capital ratios are replaced by capital 
adequacy indicators for domestic banks at the Member State level by the ECB.  For each 
banks’ specialisation (in its standard version SYMBOL uses commercial, savings and 
cooperative banks), missing capital values are estimated using a robust regression by 
common equity. Missing risk weighted assets are estimated using the capital and the 
total regulatory capital ratio. 
The Panel has assessed the adequacy and validity of the data used in the model by 
aiming to establish whether the model is empirically implemented using the best 
available and well-established data sources, and whether the construction and updating 
of the model data base follows sound scientific principles. 
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Strengths 
The Panel is aware of difficulties in finding good and reliable data on bank assets and 
liabilities and therefore recognises the team efforts in this respect. 
- The model was using the best available and well-established data sources, when it 
was initially empirically implemented. 
- The use of the Bankscope data is consistent and transparent, the data base is 
updated regularly (annually) associated with publishing a report describing the model 
data base. 
- The Team is putting a huge effort in checking the data consistency and coherence, 
and in replacing important missing data with regression models output based on 
similarities. 
 
Comments 
- The average ratio of missing data is large, for some countries even critical. The 
approach adopted for rescaling the sample to the population is critical, as it assumes the 
randomness of missing banks in the sample and uses a simple average scaling up. Due 
to non-randomness of the missing data which come largely from small banks, the error 
introduced by rescaling could be very large. 
- The risk-weighted asset and regulatory equity are key variables for simulations. In 
some cases, these variables are imputed using an estimation based on the homogeneity 
assumption. 
- The fact that current data are transformed via so-called correction coefficients to 
keep track of the implementation of the latest regulation and the correction coefficient is 
one number for the whole EU might bias results of the analysis. This is especially so, 
because the existing literature suggests that there are very large differences between 
countries. Admittedly, this issue is declining over time as banks are getting closer to the 
fully-loaded capital requirements. 
- The use of unconsolidated data may be potentially problematic for analysing 
policies such as resolution and recapitalisation, given that recapitalisation and resolution 
is usually taking place at the consolidated level. 
 
Suggestions 
- The rescaling needs to be assessed using more complete recent data. 
- At least for the around 130 banks (‘significant institutions’) supervised by the 
ECB, risk-weighted asset and regulatory equity data are available either in the EBA stress 
test analysis / transparency exercises, or directly on the bank web pages, hence could be 
collected easily. 
- Regarding correction coefficients, collaboration with the EBA in order to improve 
the input data quality is encouraged.  
- The consolidated data version of the model should be used on a more regular 
basis in addition to the unconsolidated data version. 
- More granular data are available at the bank level, e.g. the SNL for large banks, 
which could be used for the calculation of the cross-correlation, inter-bank linkages, 
portfolio similarities, liquidity ratios, etc. 
- More granular data are available also at the market level (inter-bank, bank 
holding data) that could improve the precision of the analysis. 
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3.4 Policy scenarios 
The SYMBOL model can be used to assess the impact of various what-if scenarios and 
regulatory and policy initiatives in the realm of banking. A typical scenario analysis using 
SYMBOL is represented by the Bank Recovery Resolution Directive. This Directive, which 
was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council in 2014, introduces 
and defines the order of intervention of different safety-net tools including: (i) improved 
standards on minimum capital requirements and capital conservation buffer set up in the 
CRR/CRD IV package, (ii) bail-in, (iii) Resolution Funds, and (iv) Deposit Guarantee 
Schemes. The SYMBOL model allows to assess possible effects on public finances of 
different safety-net tools of the Bank Recovery Resolution Directive. 
The Panel has assessed the construction of policy scenarios by aiming to establish 
whether the robustness and validity of the scenario building approach/process is ensured 
through interactions with other modelling tools / the involvement of stakeholders. 
 
Strengths 
- The scenario building is consistent with demands of policy makers, and thus 
largely exogenously driven reflecting regulatory changes agreed at the policy level. No 
other stakeholders are immediately involved. The robustness and validity of the scenario 
building can therefore be assessed to be broadly appropriate. 
 
Comments 
- One cause of concern is that the way policy scenarios are implemented does not 
always seem to fully reflect the details of regulatory changes. For example, the Panel is 
not convinced that all elements of the Basel III package are fully incorporated nor that 
the bail-in rule is properly captured in the model according to the most recent regulation. 
Possibly, this is due to data limitations that do not allow for a more precise scenario 
calibration (as also acknowledged by the team). Nevertheless, one implication is that 
policy recommendations may be less precise than intended. 
 
Suggestions 
- Again, these limitations call for caution when interpreting simulation results by 
policy makers and eventually an effort in including all the elements of the Basel III 
package. 
 
3.5 Transparency of the model and data 
The Panel has assessed the transparency of the model and data by aiming to establish 
whether: (i) the model is described using appropriate mathematical concepts and 
language, (ii) all key assumptions and the embedded expert knowledge are well-
documented, (iii) the mathematical description of the model, code and data are stored 
publicly accessible, and shared with the relevant scientific community, and (iv) model 
runs in support of EU policies are documented in detail – including the model code and 
data – and stored accessibly so that, if needed, the reproduction of modelling results can 
be carried out at any time. 
 
Strengths 
- The documentation of the SYMBOL model includes a full mathematical description. 
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- Part of the model’s data base is documented annually in form of JRC Technical 
Reports. 
 
Comments 
- The model code and data are not publicly accessible and are not shared with the 
relevant scientific community. 
 
Suggestions 
- The Panel recommends to aim for more openness. For example, a controlled open 
access would be one option to increase the transparency and hence legitimacy in EU 
Member States and credibility among the scientific community. 
 
3.6 Validation of the model, sensitivity/uncertainty analysis of the 
model output 
The Panel has assessed the transparency of the model and data by aiming to establish 
whether: (i) the model has been validated, (ii) the model output is subject to a 
systematic sensitivity/uncertainty analysis, and (iii) the model limitations are well 
documented and stored publicly accessible. 
 
Strengths 
- The Team is aware of a number of limiting assumptions of the model and has 
performed several sensitivity analyses, in particular regarding the correlation structure. 
 
Comments 
- No sensitivity analyses have been undertaken regarding fat tails, the Loss Given 
Default (LGD) and the ratio between the LGD and the probability of default (or some 
macro variables). 
- SRISK is being used as validation of the model's ability to predict losses. The 
Panel believes that a comparison with SRISK is not a particularly strong validation 
approach, given that both SRISK and SYMBOL measures are largely based on leverage. 
The Panel suspects that this is the main reason why the cross sectional rankings based 
on both measures are similar. 
 
Suggestions 
- The Panel suggests to perform a cross sectional ranking similar to SRISK by using 
just leverage and investigate potential differences. 
- Another potential check of the model's performance could be to investigate how 
the model is able to predict bank recapitalisations (both private and public) − using the 
2006 or 2007 data to calibrate the model − and then to look at the ability to predict the 
bank’s recapitalisation during 2008, 2009 and/or 2010.  
- In the same spirit, it would be interesting to check the model's ability to replicate 
the EBA's stress test results. Even if the underlying methodologies of the stress test and 
the SYMBOL model may differ, both approaches aim at capturing adverse tail events. The 
stress test results therefore provide a relevant reference point.  
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- To go one step further, it would be interesting to investigate in a horse race type 
analysis between the output of the SYMBOL model (i.e., bank losses) and the leverage 
ratio on their ability to predict the actual bank recapitalisations taking place during 2008, 
2009 and 2010. 
- A further useful validation exercise could be to consider banks non-performing 
loan data (at least at the country aggregate level) and see how the model is in line with 
these predictions through time. 
- A deep analysis of the actual bank portfolio loss distribution can be suggested as 
well, to understand the dimension of errors generated by the use of the simple Vasicek 
model and Monte Carlo simulation. Data provided by the European Data Warehouse could 
be useful as well as statistics provided by different national central banks on non-
performing loans and bank losses in general. 
- The model could be augmented with some feedback effects (as argued above). 
This could also serve a way to assess the model`s robustness. 
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4 Reply to the Review Report by the SYMBOL team 
The team first would like to thank the Panel members for the work the Panel has done in 
providing comments and suggestions in order to improve the overall performance of the 
SYMBOL model. Several of the comments and suggestions raised by the Panel are issues 
which were known to the SYMBOL team and some have been pointed out and discussed 
during the two days review meeting. All the suggestions will be taken in due 
consideration and their feasibility and potential will be explored. 
 
4.1 General comments 
We would like to stress that the main purpose of the model is not to predict the full 
extent of changes affecting the banking sector, or the economy as a whole, following a 
shock with or without a given regulation being in place. Rather, the aim of SYMBOL is to 
estimate economic losses as a “standardised” measure of the intensity of the 
consequences of shock under different regulatory settings. Incidentally, it should be 
noted that economic losses are different from accounting losses as reported in the banks’ 
balance sheet and refer to the present value of realised and emergent losses over the 
whole life of the portfolio of the bank at the time of simulation. These losses might 
appear in bank accounts over multiple years as losses, reserves and deteriorated loans.  
Economic losses, when compared to loss absorbing capacity and tools, then represent the 
comparative “pressure” that would be put on economic actors by the simulated shocks 
under different regulatory scenarios, “ceteris paribus” (i.e. all other things being equal). 
Losses and capital shortfalls obtained from the model would need to be directly offset by 
supplying new capital, or could generate other dynamical effects (i.e. request capital 
injections, de-leveraging, de-risking, restructuring, cascading impacts on the rest of the 
economy …), but in any case larger losses would generate stronger pressure on actors 
and the economy. 
Other aspects, as some mentioned in the review (e.g. quantification of dynamical 
impacts), though important and interesting from an academic and policy perspective are, 
indeed, out of the scope of SYMBOL as currently conceived. Moreover, increasing the 
number of assumptions would introduce additional factors driving the results whose 
analysis would then need to be integrated with a full-fledged model of the economy. 
Having said that, exploring further extensions of the model to expand it or integrate it 
with other dynamic models is surely an avenue worth exploring, and we will engage 
some of our academic partners on the topic. 
As far as collaborations with other policy institutions is concerned, this is already in place, 
in particular for defining scenarios and for assessing data quality. Nevertheless we also 
agree that, depending on the possibility of the partner institutions in sharing data, more 
could be done in this direction. 
 
4.2 Specific comments 
Section 3.1 (Methodology) 
The value of LGD is actually 45% as regulatory default value (not 40%). 
We run several analyses changing the level of correlation and we also have developed a 
version of the model where the correlation is not fixed, but calibrated using bank-specific 
variables (ROA) and macro variables (GDP growth rate). A copula based estimation of 
banks’ assets correlation is now being considered as a potential improvement of the 
model, as well as using fat-tailed shocks distributions for the simulations. 
The contagion module is also undergoing a massive revision to overcome the data 
availability constraints: we are currently working on the estimation of bilateral banks’ 
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exposures based on the aggregate interbank loans and deposits. The same methodology 
could be applied, in principle, to different contagion channels (derivatives, etc.). 
Nonetheless, it should be stressed that data limitations remain paramount in this kind of 
exercises. Data availability in the EBA stress test could be explored to assess the 
feasibility of estimating derivatives and traded assets networks besides interbank 
networks. 
 
Section 3.2 (Policy) 
As a general comment, we agree with the Panel that policy initiatives could benefit from 
multiple sources of modelling support and by integrating modelling and qualitative 
approaches. For example, cost analysis is not part of SYMBOL based analysis. Cost 
analyses of new banks regulations are usually incorporated into ex-ante impact 
assessments involving SYMBOL, but they are based on different models (e.g. CRDIV ex-
ante impact assessment provides cost/benefits analysis using SYMBOL and QUEST). 
We are always willing to cooperate with other authorities where possible to refine the 
working assumptions and to overcome the data availability issue. However, even in these 
cases, data cannot normally be made directly available to us, but we share our data-sets 
with other institutions who then check it against their own confidential data. For instance, 
we have recently collaborated with the ECB for an analysis of the size of potential fiscal 
backstop for the resolution fund. In particular, results obtained from SYMBOL simulations 
were analysed by ECB using their own additional confidential data. The final outcome of 
the exercise was then discussed and analysed jointly. 
In general, all the official documents and reports we produce clearly spell out all the 
limitations and caveats we face in our analyses. 
In several exercises, we provided results for different crisis levels, which, in part, 
provides uncertainty assessment. Numerical uncertainty bounds for marginal 
distributions obtained under bootstrapping are extremely tight, and we are currently 
working on a methodology to obtain uncertainty bounds for conditional distributions, 
which are being used more and more often. Data uncertainty bounds (i.e. measurement 
error to account for inexactly measured data in balance sheets) are not readily 
computable as error margins for underlying data are not available. 
Leverage ratios are indeed being considered as constraints triggering bank 
recapitalisation (see above discussion, in the general comment part, on the use of 
recapitalisation needs as a standardised measurement of crisis consequences) in some 
exercises. Liquidity ratio and net stable funding ratio cannot be easily incorporated in the 
model mainly because of data availability. 
If the Panel refers to MIFID/MIFIR initiatives: those are out-of-the scope of the model.  
Pillar 2 data are usually not available, but if they would become available, they could 
easily be incorporated in the model.  
Regarding the resolution framework and the bail-in, we are aware that our model has 
some limitations: as already mentioned, they are always spelled out in the reports and 
they are mainly driven by data availability. 
 
Section 3.3 (Data) 
Data availability and “cleanliness” is indeed an issue we are aware of. Analysis on 
representativeness of the sample of small/medium banks versus large banks is under 
investigation: based on this we would consider a change in the methodology to achieve a 
better rescaling from sample to population. 
In more research-oriented papers we have used the ECB/stress test sample. In this case, 
missing data are not an issue, even in the public data-sets. The data is however at 
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consolidated level, which is not suitable for all applications, e.g. in the context of DGS 
interventions, where interventions often occur at unconsolidated (national) level rather 
than at group level. 
As correction coefficients are concerned, country specific values are not available, and 
this seems to be an issue that cannot be solved. Nevertheless, we use different 
correction coefficients to adjust capital and RWA for banks of different sizes. In particular 
we differentiate SIIBs, large, medium and small banks. The issue of corrector coefficients 
is also becoming less and less important as the data of full implementation of CRR/CRD is 
being reached. 
Regarding missing variables, they are imputed by differentiating banks with respect to 
specialisation. While we recognise that this approach has limitations, we stress that we 
do not assume full homogeneity, as we consider different size classes and typologies of 
banks. 
Based on our research and experience, using consolidated is not a viable way to infer 
missing values in unconsolidated data. The model is therefore run either on consolidated 
or on unconsolidated data, depending on the purpose of the analysis. 
Regarding the use of confidential data, we in fact had occasions to run the model using 
confidential data. The results were actually closely in line (at aggregate MS or EU level) 
with those obtained using publicly available data. In fact, even if only informally, in some 
recent exercises, comparison of simulations using confidential and publicly available data 
at individual level (consolidated) has been performed by a third party with access to both 
sources, leading to the conclusion that results were sufficiently close. 
Regarding market level data, if the Panel refers to use annual report data, we confirm 
that we use them in case some discrepancy is found in our sample, and in any case for 
very large banks with missing data. In general, it is not possible to use directly annual 
report information, since the reporting standards and balance sheet schemes differ 
across different banks, and we need to rely on a commercial provider to reclassify all 
balance sheets according to a common template and definitions. 
 
Section 3.4 (Policy scenario) 
We are aware that, due to lack of available data, we cannot properly incorporate the 
entire BRRD framework in SYMBOL simulations, but we need to make some assumptions. 
However, we always detail all these limitations and working hypotheses to be as 
transparent as possible. 
 
Section 3.5 (Transparency) 
The model code will be made accessible in the near future. We are currently working with 
our IPR service to prepare a licensing framework. Data cannot be disclosed in full to the 
public, because of provider rights. We however normally make estimated distributions 
and aggregate results available and, depending on conditions, we could run simulations 
using third party data in order to check results across our own and third party 
implementations of the model. 
 
Section 3.6 (Validation) 
All the suggestions made in this Section are indeed very interesting, and we are going to 
explore their feasibility with academic partners which are part of our Community of 
Practice network (e.g. ability to predict recapitalisations occurred during the crisis, NPLs, 
etc.) 
The SRISK was used not to validate the losses, but to compare individual bank risk 
contribution ranking and their systemic risk ranking. An analysis of leverage as a driving 
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factor of SYMBOL and SRISK and other approaches will be considered in the context of 
further model development work. 
An approach incorporating alternative distributions of shocks at individual bank level is 
being currently explored as part of model development. 
Regarding your suggestion on the feedback effects, we would like to emphasise that 
SYMBOL is a static model (there is no sequencing in the simulated defaults, but they are 
assumed to occur simultaneously). Its application in the context of feed-back loops would 
require a number of additional working assumptions and they could not be easily 
implemented. 
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5 Conclusions 
SYMBOL is a micro-simulation portfolio model developed by the JRC of the European 
Commission that implements the Basel II/III regulatory framework, which imposes that 
each bank satisfies regulatory capital requirements to guard against the risks the bank 
may face. This capital provides a buffer against unexpected losses at a specific level of 
statistical confidence (in Basel II/III fixed at the 99.9% level). The amount of the 
regulatory capital necessary to support a portfolio of debt securities depends on the 
probability distribution of the portfolio loss of each bank. The SYMBOL model simulates 
this probability density function (PDF) of the banks’ credit portfolio. 
The present reports details the outcome of the review of SYMBOL, which was carried out 
by an external scientific Review Panel closely following ‘Guidelines for the review of 
models used in support of EU policies’. The review was carried out by scrutinising six 
areas of the model development and SYMBOL’s use for the EU policy support: validity of 
the methodological approach, model’s capacity to adequately address EC policy analysis 
needs, adequacy and validity of the data used in the model, construction and analysis of 
policy scenarios, transparency of the model and data, and Validation of the model, 
sensitivity/uncertainty analysis of the model output. 
The review aimed at verifying and consolidating the scientific credibility of SYMBOL and 
identifying most promising/relevant areas for a future model development. As regards 
the validity of the methodological approach, the Report details to what extent the 
conceptual framework of the model is grounded in state-of-the-art theoretical insights, 
and the methodology implementing the model follows sound scientific principles. As 
regards the model capacity to adequately address EC policy analysis needs, the Report 
details to what extent the model can answer relevant policy questions in a sufficiently 
detailed/disaggregated way, and the model is capable to capture challenges faced by 
specificities of the banking sector. As regards the adequacy and validity of the data used 
in the model, the Report details to what extent the model is empirically implemented 
using the best available and well-established data sources, and the construction and 
updating of the model data base follows sound scientific principles. As regards the 
construction of policy scenarios, the Report details to what extent the robustness and 
validity of the scenario building approach/process is ensured through interactions with 
other modelling tools / the involvement of stakeholders. As regards the transparency of 
the model and data, the Report details to what extent the model is described using 
appropriate mathematical concepts and language, all key assumptions and the embedded 
expert knowledge are well-documented, the mathematical description of the model, code 
and data are stored publicly accessible, and shared with the relevant scientific 
community, and model runs in support of EU policies are documented in detail – 
including the model code and data – and stored accessibly so that, if needed, the 
reproduction of modelling results can be carried out at any time. As regards the 
transparency of the model and data, the Report details to what extent the model has 
been validated, the model output is subject to a systematic sensitivity/uncertainty 
analysis, and the model limitations are well documented and stored publicly accessible. 
The report includes also a first reaction from the SYMBOL team, noting that several of the 
comments and suggestions raised by the Panel are issues which were known to the 
SYMBOL team a priori and some have been pointed out and discussed during the two 
days review meeting. In any case, all the suggestions will be taken in due consideration 
and their feasibility and potential will be explored. 
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List of abbreviations and definitions 
CRD  Capital Requirements Directive 
CRR  Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and 
investment firms 
DG FISMA Directorate-General for Financial Stability, Financial Services and Capital 
Markets Union 
DG JRC  Directorate-General Joint Research Centre 
EBA  European Banking Authority 
ECB  European Central Bank 
FSDA  Forward Search for Data Analysis 
GDP  Gross Domestic Product 
IA  Impact Assessment 
IPR  Intellectual Property Rights 
IRB  Internal Rating-Based 
LGD  Loss Given Default 
MIDAS  Modelling Inventory and Database Access Services 
MIFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 
MIFIR   Markets in Financial Instruments Regulation 
NPLs  Non-performing loans  
PD  Probability of default 
PDF  Probability density function  
QUEST  QUarterly European Simulation Tool 
ROA  Return on assets 
SNL  Savings N Loan 
SRISK  Conditional capital shortfall measure of systemic risk 
SYMBOL SYstemic Model of Banking Originated Losses 
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Annex 2. Meetings’ agenda of the SYMBOL Review Panel 
Thursday, 9 November 
9:00 – 10:30 
Meeting of the Review Panel (Panel members only) 
10:30 – 10:45 
Welcome and introductions (Chair) 
10:45 – 12:45 
Presentations by and discussion with the SYMBOL team members, focussing on questions 
that the chair of the Review Panel has sent before the meeting 
12:45 – 14:00 
Lunch 
14:00 – 15:00 
Presentations by and discussion with the SYMBOL team members, focussing on questions 
that the chair of the Review Panel has sent before the meeting (contin.) 
15:00 – 17:45 
Meeting of the Review Panel, agreeing on key points to be included in the Report 
18:45 
Adjourn first SYMBOL review day 
20:00 
Working dinner of Review Panel members 
 
Friday, 10 November 
09:30 – 12:45 
Meeting of the Review Panel, identifying key elements of the review report, drafting 
conclusions 
12:45 – 14:00 
Lunch 
14:00 – 16:00 
Meeting of the Review Panel, identifying key elements of the review report, drafting 
conclusions (contin.) 
17:00 
Adjourn second SYMBOL review day 
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